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Bettina Isengard and Thorsten Schneider Abstract 
The introduction of a single European currency, the euro, is one of the biggest 
political projects undertaken up to now promoting European unity. However, in 
some countries – such as Germany – acceptance is still not high, even several 
years after the currency’s introduction. Yet widespread acceptance of the new 
currency is absolutely necessary for the idea of Europe to succeed, and its failure 
could exacerbate historic tensions and resentments within Europe. 
In this study, we concentrate on people’s attitudes towards the euro and their 
changing perceptions from a longitudinal perspective. Since data sources on this 
topic are rare, we rely on German micro-data from the Socio-Economic Panel 
Study 1999 to 2002 and focus only on the single country of Germany.  
Our main findings are the following: first, a large part of the German 
population was worried about the new currency, both immediately before and 
after its introduction. Second, people with better access to information were less 
concerned about the new currency. Third, persons who profit most from the new 
currency in Germany – EU foreigners – have lower concerns about the euro in 
general. Fourth, difficulties in handling the new currency increased people’s 
concerns about the euro significantly. Additionally, we argue that the monthly 
pattern of remaining and becoming concerned in 2002 is traceable back to media 
reports on price increases. For these reasons, future EMU member states should 
prepare their populations better for these challenges. 
  
1. Introduction 
Since January 2002, twelve member states of the European Union (EU) have 
introduced the euro. Those who have not include the countries of Denmark, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, which rejected membership in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU), and the ten new states that have joined since May 2004 
but not yet introduced the euro. Since its introduction, the euro has acted as a 
constant daily reminder to the citizens of the participating countries that they live 
in the EU and that political decisions at the European level have real, tangible 
consequences in their everyday lives. 
Money is more than just a medium of exchange, an abstract purchasing power, 
or a factor of evaluation. It is a powerful symbol identifying the individual with 
the nation, evoking a subjective feeling of “togetherness” (see, for example, 
Deflem, 2003). So far there is no European national state, and until there is, the 
euro will have to continue surviving without this form of symbolic identification. 
In fact, the euro appears to be promoting the formation of a European identity and 
will likely continue to do so in the future.  
Europe-wide polls before and after introduction of the euro show that 
acceptance of the new currency varies widely from country to country (European 
Commission, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). The lowest proportion of people in favour 
of the euro has consistently been found in those countries that are not members of 
the EMU (Denmark, Sweden and the UK). However, acceptance is also low in 
Germany and the Netherlands, both of which belong to the group of countries 
whose national identity is constructed primarily through their economic and 
political system.
1 In those countries whose national identity is strongly culturally 
defined, such as Italy and Greece, acceptance of the euro is much higher (Müller-
Peters, 1998, p. 709; Pepermans and Verleye, 1998, p. 687ff.). 
In the following, we concentrate on a single country: Germany. Not only is it 
one of the countries that showed low acceptance of the euro before its 
introduction, it is also a country whose economic system is important for national 
identity. This has primarily historical grounds. One consequence of the Second 
World War was that flags and national hymns became deeply problematic as    Seite  2 
symbols of identification for most Germans. The German mark, however, became 
a national symbol of the country’s economic recovery and prosperity (Helleiner, 
1998). Even for residents of the German Democratic Republic, the German mark 
was an object of aspiration, symbolizing freedom and wealth.  
In addition to the particular characteristics that are unique to the different 
countries, there are differences within populations that influence attitudes toward 
the euro, and changes in individual attitudes over time. Especially the introduction 
of the actual currency in coins and notes can influence the process of attitude 
formation. According to social-psychological theories of self-perception and 
cognitive dissonance (Bem, 1972; Festinger, 1957), people’s concerns about the 
euro should decrease after its introduction. This idea is based on two assumptions: 
first, that individuals evaluate the euro positively because they use it every day, 
and second, that since individuals cannot change the situation, the cognitive 
dissonance can only be diminished by adapting to institutional conditions. In 
contrast, according to the theory of reactance (Brehm, 1976), concerns about the 
euro will increase after its introduction because people feel that their freedom has 
been reduced and react defiantly. Only theories conceptualising attitude changes 
as a result of learning processes offer the possibility to explain both a reduction 
and an increase in concerns towards the euro (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken 
et al., 1989). 
To test these theories and analyse the individual factors influencing and 
especially changing attitudes following the issue of a new currency, we use a 
nation-wide, representative longitudinal study: the German Socio-Economic Panel 
Study (SOEP). Unlike most studies on happiness and life satisfaction, the SOEP 
does not study attitudes toward the euro using a positive item such as ‘how 
satisfied are you with...’, but formulates the question in terms of concerns. 
 
2.  Previous research and theoretical background 
The existing literature reveals two dominant factors influencing attitudes towards 
the euro: extent of knowledge and general beliefs (see e.g. Müller-Peters et al.,    Seite  3 
1998a, b; Pepermans and Verleye, 1998; Isengard and Schneider, 2002; Meier-
Pesti and Kirchler, 2003a, b). 
The first of these – the extent of knowledge or information level – is crucial for 
attitude formation since a higher level of knowledge enables better assessment of 
consequences. The literature finds evidence that highly informed people not only 
have a more positive attitude towards the euro – even if they are not fully 
convinced about it – they are also better able to cope with the situation, despite the 
fact that they cannot change it. This latter case is called secondary control 
(Rothbaum et al., 1982).
2 
However, Luna-Arocas et al. (2001) discovered that in Spain and Portugal, not 
only well informed individuals are in favour of the euro, but also those with poor 
knowledge of the new currency and of the European Union in general. The 
attitude towards the euro is determined more by European identity than by 
economic expectations or knowledge. European identity outweighs other 
predictors such as information level and economic expectations. 
The second main factor influencing personal attitudes are general beliefs. New 
ideas that influence openness to new situations have to be integrated into existing 
belief systems. Different socialisation processes and past experiences may lead to 
different general beliefs and cultures, and therefore produce differences in 
thinking, feeling and acting (Schwartz, 1997).  
Concerns about the euro can be seen as an attitude. There are extensive and 
diverse theoretical traditions regarding attitude formation and change (Chaiken 
and Stangor, 1987). Attitudes can be either positive or negative evaluations, and 
are mainly the result of cognitive information processing (Rosenberg and 
Hovland, 1960, p. 3). Thus, they can reflect short-term positive or negative 
emotions, long-term beliefs determined by knowledge, or general beliefs that 
emerge through socialisation processes and past experiences. 
Attitude changes can be the result of learning processes based on socially 
transmitted experiences and social communication. These processes are a function 
of the admission of message contents and their reinforcement (Staats, 1968; for 
further elaborated models see Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken et al., 1989).    Seite  4 
This might be the reason why Germans distanced themselves quickly from the 
German mark after the euro was introduced in January 2002. Instead of the 
predicted ‘Euro-phobia’, there was a widespread ‘Euro-phoria’ in the first few 
weeks following the introduction of the currency. At that time, press coverage was 
extremely positive. However, after lively widespread discussion about price 
increases in the context of the currency reform, worries about euro increased. 
Attitude changes might therefore result in part from persuasive arguments in the 
media.  
Bem (1972) attributes changes in attitudes to a process of self-perception 
whereby people infer their attitudes from their own behaviour under certain 
circumstances. This is particularly the case if internal references are weak and no 
pronounced knowledge is present. For this theory to apply to concerns about the 
euro, a necessary precondition is that people have no firm opinion about it. The 
experience of quickly getting rid of the old German currency would lead, through 
daily behaviour (‘I pay with euros instead of marks’), to a positive attitude (‘I like 
the euro because I have no problems paying with it’). 
Furthermore some approaches attribute attitude changes to cognitive processes. 
Cognitions are understood as the totality of a person's thoughts: their opinions, 
values, knowledge, and beliefs. The cognitive approach incorporates two theories 
that lead to different predictions about attitudes towards the mark and the euro: 
one is the theory of reactance, and the other is the theory of cognitive dissonance. 
According to the theory of reactance (Brehm, 1966), individuals aspire to 
behave freely. If their freedom of choice has been threatened or taken away, 
psychological reactance emerges. In this case, people attempt to recover their 
endangered or lost liberty by upgrading the threatened or eliminated alternative 
and devaluating the forced alternative (Brehm, 1976). This cognitive restructuring 
process is motivated by resistance to liberty restriction and refusal to adapt or 
conform. In the case of the euro, this would imply that they should reject the euro 
and place higher value on the German mark. 
Greitemeyer et al. (2001) have produced empirical evidence that the reactance 
theory does not adequately explain attitudes towards the euro, and instead favour    Seite  5 
the dissonance theory.
3 The theory of cognitive dissonance implies that people 
aspire to a balanced cognitive system (Festinger, 1957). The relations among 
different cognitions can be either relevant (content is coherent) or irrelevant 
(content is incoherent). Relevant relations can be consonant or dissonant. 
Cognitive dissonance is generated, for example, if one’s behaviour is inconsistent 
with one’s own opinion. This creates an aversive feeling, as well as the motivation 
to avoid or eliminate this feeling. If the behaviour demonstrated is not reversible, 
then the preferred method of dissonance reduction is to adapt the opinion to the 
behaviour.  
The introduction of the euro leads to dissonance if people reject the new 
currency. As this situation can only be escaped through emigration, the cost-
effective way of reducing cognitive dissonance is to change the negative attitude. 
 
3. Data 
The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) is an interdisciplinary 
longitudinal study of private households in Germany that provides data for 
scientific research. Since 1984, it has been a representative source of data on 
different topics such as working biographies, education, income, demographic 
developments, health, time use, as well as satisfaction and values, whereby each 
person in a household being 17 years and older gives his/her own answers. This 
design provides representative longitudinal microdata on individuals, households 
and families (SOEP Group, 2001). Because of the diversity and richness of the 
data, it is analysed by researchers worldwide from a broad range of disciplines to 
study a many different topics. Psychologists, for example, have investigated 
whether the change in marital status has a long-lasting influence on subjective 
well-being (Lucas et al., 2003). Sociologists have conducted research on the 
careers of couples (Blossfeld et al., 1998) and on poverty and welfare (Muffels 
and Fouarge, 2004; Headey et al., 2000), while economists have analysed the data 
to evaluate the impact of health care reforms on individual behaviour 
(Winkelmann, 2004).    Seite  6 
Although the survey has studied concerns in such areas as job security and 
environmental protection from the very beginning, these issues have not been 
analysed extensively. Since 1999 – the year in which the European Monetary 
Union started – the SOEP has asked about people’s concerns towards the euro. 
There are three response categories: very concerned, somewhat concerned or not 
at all concerned. In 2002, additional questions were asked about the expected 
advantages and disadvantages of the single currency.
4 For the first year the euro 
questions were asked (1999), the survey includes answers from 14,035 persons. 
The sample was enlarged in 2000 to 24,331 and declined in the two successive 
years to 22,151 and 21,048 respondents, respectively. The SOEP thus constitutes 
a large data set with which we can identify global as well as individual changes in 
attitudes towards the euro over time. 
In our multivariate analysis, we use the highest level of school attainment, the 
use of the Internet, and political interest as indicators for the level of knowledge. 
They cover education, access to information, and the observation of political 
debates. 
As indicators of general beliefs, we use expected life satisfaction in five years 
time, long-term party preferences, and regional and national origins. The expected 
life satisfaction is clearly oriented towards the future. Here, we assume that 
individuals who believe that they will be happy with their life in five years time 
have a more optimistic attitude towards life and therefore evaluate the euro in a 
more positive manner.
5 
Political interest is an aspect which reflects the level of political information. 
Long-term party preferences express political convictions and ideologies. As with 
religious identity, party identification represents a core component of individual 
self-definition. The acceptance of the euro should differ according to party 
preferences: voters for extreme right-wing parties should be expected to reject the 
euro, while voters for the liberal parties should accept it.
6 
National and regional origin does not actually define general beliefs, because 
general beliefs of individuals are determined by acquired attitudes and opinions, 
whereas nationality is determined simply by one’s place of birth. Nevertheless, it    Seite  7 
can be assumed that specific attitudes towards the euro can be linked to national 
origins via socialisation and cultural influences. The fear of losing national 
autonomy and of dependence on other European states in monetary matters could 
influence the formation of broad national attitudes towards a new currency (Jonas 
et al., 2002, p. 148).  
We assume that the German mark is not a national symbol for foreigners and in 
addition,




4.1   The development of concerns towards the euro 
First we look at the extent of concerns towards the euro and their development 
over time (cf. Fig. 1). The proportion of individuals with concerns was 60% in 
1999, and in the following two years somewhat higher (68% and 67%). A sharp 
decline is observable for the year 2002 when the euro notes and coins became the 
means of payment (52%). If we differentiate between those who were somewhat 
concerned and those who were very concerned, we see that the rates of somewhat 
concerned individuals were nearly stable across the time period (40% in 1999, 
37% in 2002). However, the proportion of very concerned individuals falls by half 
from 2001 to 2002.  
The time series can only show distributions over time, but not what went on 
before. It might be that when reporting concerns, people give answers that are 
unreliable and arbitrary. We report individual changes from one year to the next, 
concentrating on individual changes from 2000 to 2001, when we observed a 
stable distribution in Fig. 1, and from 2001 to 2002, when we found a reduction in 
the proportion of very concerned individuals in the cross-sectional comparison. 
In Table 1, upper panel, we see that most of the individuals reporting no 
concerns in 2000 also did not report concerns in 2001 (65%), and the concerns 
they did report were seldomly strong (8%). A comparable pattern is found for 
very concerned individuals: 60% of them give the same answer in the following    Seite  8 
year, 30% of them switch to some concerns, and only 10% report having no more 
concerns at all.  
 
Figure 1: Proportions of individuals concerned about  
  the introduction of the euro
1 
 
          















1 Weighted data.   
  Sources: SOEP 1999-2002, own calculations. 
 
The answers from the middle category ‘somewhat concerned’ are not so stable. 
Half of the individuals report the same category in the following year, one-quarter 
report not having any concerns, and one-quarter report stronger concerns.  
If we look at the individual changes in being concerned before and after the 
introduction (cf. Table 1, lower panel) we can see a particularly high stability of 
unconcerned individuals in 2001 (77%). On the other hand, we observe that 
concerns are reduced from 2001 to 2002. Nearly half of the individuals from the 
middle category still give the same answer in the following year, but the dividing 
lines among the rest are completely different from what we previously observed 
(2000 to 2001). Now we have a high proportion of individuals who are no longer 
concerned, but only a small fraction with higher concerns. This comparison shows 
that concerns are not driven by a random process. 
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Table 1: Individual stability of concerns towards the euro over years
1 
 
concerned about €  in the following year   
in 2000  not at all  somewhat  very   total 
not at all  65 %  27 %  8 %  100 % 
somewhat 25  %  52 %  22 %  99 % 
very  10 %  30 %  60 %  100 % 
total   33 %  38 %  29 %  100 % 
 
in 2001 
      
not at all  77 %  18 %  5 %  100 % 
somewhat 43  %  46 %  10 %  99 % 
very  23 %  46 %  32 %  101 % 
total   49 %  37 %  15 %  101 % 
1 Longitudinal weighted data. 
Sources: SOEP 2000-2002, own calculations. 
 
4.2  What are the concerns towards the euro? 
There is a high correlation between the extent of more general concerns towards 
the euro and the expected advantages or disadvantages (cf. Fig. 2): 88% of those 
people not concerned about the euro believe that a single currency promotes 
European unity. However, only 29% of those individuals hold this belief if their 
concerns are very strong. People with some concerns take a middle position, with 
61% expecting a positive effect on the process on European unification. 
A similar pattern can be observed if we look at the correlation between 
concerns and the expectations of economic advantages arising from the new 
currency: the stronger the concerns, the lower the percentage of people expecting 
economic advantages. In all cases, however, expectations of economic advantages 
are significantly lower than expectations regarding European unity. This means 
that individuals connect the new currency with political rather than economic 
changes.    Seite  10 
Figure 2: Kind of concerns towards the euro: Expected advantages and 


























not concerned at all somewhat concerned very concerned
 
1 Weighted data. 
Sources: SOEP 2002, own calculations. 
 
If we look at the items regarding disadvantages, the correlation is reversed. 
Reports of increased concerns go hand in hand with perceptions of negative 
consequences of the euro. The item ‘sad about losing the German mark’ is an 
emotional statement. This statement is affirmed by 28% of individuals with no 
concerns about the euro but 92% of those with strong concerns. A high percentage 
of those with some concerns report being sad about losing the old currency as well 
(72%). 
We observe a similar pattern in the expectation of disadvantages for Germany 
in general and of a decreasing stability of private investments, but lower figures 
regarding private investments. We have already observed lower percentages for 
the statement on economic advantages. The findings that attitudes towards the 
euro depend on economic expectations are in line with the results of studies on the    Seite  11 
Netherlands (van Everdingen and van Raaij, 1998), but some aspects are more 
pronounced in Germany. 
Up to now we have only shown the development in concerns towards the euro 
in Germany and what goes hand in hand with these concerns. In the next chapter, 
we investigate what influences these concerns in the year 2001. Thereafter, we 
will look for reasons behind the decrease and changes in concerns from 2001 to 
2002.  
 
4.3  Determinants of concerns towards the euro 
To test what influences concerns, we assumed an ordered logit model
8 as the 
dependent variable with three categories: unconcerned, somewhat concerned and 
strongly concerned about the euro. Positive regression coefficients indicate 
stronger concerns, and negative coefficients indicate lower or no concerns. The 
results for being concerned in 2001 are reported in Model 1 (cf. Table 2). 
We can see that those with higher educational qualifications
9 are less 
concerned about the introduction of the euro than individuals with medium or low 
qualifications. However, young people still attending school are slightly more 
likely to be concerned.  
The influence of political interest is not consistent. Individuals with high levels 
of interest in politics are less concerned than those with little interest. However, 
the regression coefficient for individuals with high interest is not significant. 
People with no interest whatsoever have the lowest concerns. This is comparable 
to the results mentioned above for Spain and Portugal. It thus seems clear that a 
complete lack of political interest leads to an unconcerned attitude towards the 
euro.  
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Table  2:  Ordered logit model about being concerned in 2001 and logit 
models for changes in being concerned before and after 
introduction of the euro 
  model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4  model 5 
  concerned  in 
2001 
concerned in 2001 
=> not concerned in 2002 
not concerned  in 2001 
=> concerned in 2002 
highest school level (low)       
middle secondary qualification  -0,02   0,14**   0,11*  -0,24**  -0,20* 
higher qualification  -0,50**   0,37**   0,35**  -0,68**  -0,68** 
still in school   -0,83**   0,75**   0,70**  -0,75**  -0,73** 
interested in politics (not so much)       
very much  -0,12 -0,01 -0,08 -0,19 -0,16 
much  -0,08*   0,12*   0,07  -0,17*  -0,13 
not at all  -0,15**   0,00   0,02   0,07  -0,14 
using internet   -0,31**   0,23**   0,22**  -0,25**  -0,24** 
expected life satisfaction in 5 years 
(ambivalent) 
     
unhappy   0,36**  -0,51**  -0,37**   0,77**   0,60** 
happy  -0,36**   0,40**   0,39**  -0,31**  -0,25* 
totally happy  -0,39**   0,69**   0,63**  -0,25  -0,15 
long lasting party preference 
(social democrats, SPD) 
     
conservatives (CDU/CSU)   0,10*  -0,04  -0,09   0,21   0,30** 
liberals (FDP)  -0,35**  -0,16 -0,25 -0,27 -0,23 
green party (Grüne, B’90)  -0,64**   0,40**   0,50**  -0,38  -0,45* 
socialist / former communists (PDS)    0,01 -0,05 -0,07 -0,10   0,03 
right wing parties (DVU, REP)   1,56**  -1,53**  -1,48**   1,68**   1,66* 
other parties   0,31*   0,12   0,25   0,24   0,29 
no long lasting preference   0,13**  -0,11*  -0,14*   0,19*   0,29** 
origin (West German)       
East German   0,57**  -0,34**  -0,38**   0,30**   0,37** 
foreigner of the EU  -0,51**   0,19   0,26*   0,00   0,00 
other foreigner   -0,35** -0,32** -0,15    0,30*    0,12 
income position   (2. + 3. quartile)         
lowest income quartile  -0,01 -0,08 -0,05   0,28**    0,23** 
highest income quartile  -0,31**   0,12*   0,09  -0,41**  -0,34** 
gender: men  -0,13**   0,18**   0,09*  -0,27**  -0,12 
age (in years)  -0,005**   0,01**   0,01**  -0,02**  -0,02** 
month of questioning (February)       
January     0,18**   0,13*  -0,26**  -0,24* 
March    -0,15**  -0,14*   0,15   0,07 
April   -0,33**  -0,31**   0,21   0,17 
May     -0,43**  -0,38**   0,74**   0,68** 
June and later    -0,48**  -0,49**   0,36**   0,31* 
difficulties in handling the new money 
(not at all) 
      
great difficulty    -1,53**     1,88** 
some difficulty    -0,74**     0,76** 
difficulties in converting DM amounts 
into EURO (not at all) 
      
great difficulty     -1,10**     0,63* 
some difficulty     -0,48**     0,61** 
cut point 1  -1,53**      
cut point 2   0,24**      
constant    -1,50** -0,97**   0,09  -0,47* 
Number of observations  20852  12238  12238  5920  5920 
Pseudo-R
2  (Mc-Fadden)  0,05 0,04 0,10 0,09 0,15 
Level of significance:  * < 5 %;  ** < 1 %. 
Sources: SOEP 2001, 2002, own calculations. 
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The third factor describing level of knowledge is Internet usage.
10 Individuals 
using modern media are less concerned about the new currency than people not 
using the Internet. To provide an example of how the level of knowledge 
influences the probability of being concerned, we calculate the probability of 
being somewhat or very concerned for a person with special characteristics (46-
year-old man from West Germany, etc.). If this person has a low level of 
education and does not use the Internet, he has a 77% probability of having 
concerns, whereas if he does use the Internet, the probability is six percentage 
points lower. If our hypothetical 46-year-old West German man is highly 
educated, the probability decreases to 66%, and if he does use the Internet, the 
probability decreases further to 59%. 
We return again to Model 1 and look at the variables indicating general beliefs. 
Those who expect to be happy or even totally happy in five years time are 
significantly less concerned about the future currency than those who are 
ambivalent on this topic. On the other hand, people who have a pessimistic 
attitude towards the future have stronger concerns. 
Next we look at political affiliations. The Social Democrats (SPD) are our 
reference group. Affiliates of the other large party, the Christian Democrats 
(CDU) have slightly higher concerns than the Social Democrats. Individuals with 
a party preference for the Socialist party (PDS, former East German Communists) 
do not differ from the Social Democrats. People with a long-lasting party 
preference for the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) and for the Green Party 
(Grüne) are less worried than the Social Democrats. These results are not 
surprising, as the FDP is in favour of a free market, while supporters of the Green 
Party are often post-materialists who are interested in Europe as a political 
project. In contrast, supporters of the extreme right-wing parties (e.g. DVU) have 
a significantly higher probability of being concerned: they believe that the new 
currency is not compatible with their understanding of the national state. 
For national and regional origins, we observe large differences in the degree of 
concerns.
11 We observe that Germans, and especially East Germans, are more 
concerned about the euro than foreigners. Furthermore, foreigners from a country    Seite  14 
that belonged to the EU in 2001 are less concerned than other foreigners. Both 
groups have a lower attachment to the German mark and EU foreigners enjoy 
direct advantages when travelling and transferring money to their home countries 
(except Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom). But there are also strong 
differences between German citizens. East Germans are much more concerned 
about the euro than West Germans. They obtained the ‘desired’ German mark in 
1990, but their vision of rapid economic boom has not been achieved. On the 
contrary, there are high unemployment rates in East Germany as well as a strong 
movement of labour in the direction of West Germany. 
Some examples are presented in Table 3. Here we look at the influence of 
origins and ethnicity on concerns – first independent of the extent of concerns, 
then on strong concerns regarding the euro (for a person with specific 
characteristics). If the person originates from East Germany, he has an 85% 
probability of being somewhat or severely worried. A comparable West German 
person is eight percentage points less likely to have concerns, while an EU 
foreigner is nearly 20 percentage points less likely to have concerns. If we 
calculate the probability of having only strong concerns, we see the same pattern, 
although the distances are greater. A West German is 14 percentage points less 
likely to have strong concerns than an East German, and a EU foreigner is 25 
percentage points less likely. The distance between West Germans and EU 
foreigners remains the same in both cases. 
 
Table 3: Examples of the influence of origin and ethnicity on 
concerns towards the euro in 2001
1 
 
concerned  West German  East German  EU foreigner   other foreigner
somewhat or very  77 %  85 %  66 %  70 % 
very   36 %  50 %  25 %  28 % 
1 Probabilities calculated from Model 1 for a 46-year-old, low-
educated male with middle income and ambivalent future 
expectations who does not use the Internet, who has little interest 
in politics and has no party preferences.  
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Finally, we consider income position and gender and age. We find that people 
who are in the highest income quartile are less likely of being concerned than 
individuals with middle incomes.
12 However, no significant effect is observable 
for the lowest income group. Men have a lower probability of being concerned 
about the new currency than women. This pattern is well known from the research 
on concerns, anxiety and anomy (e.g. Rosenfield 1980; Kessler and McRae 1981). 
 
4.4  Changing attitudes towards the euro 
To look at the changing concerns before and after the introduction of the euro 
currency, we estimate some logit models.
13 We model the loss of, as well as the 
development of concerns. Fig. 3 illustrates our procedure. First we look at 
individuals who were concerned in 2001. We construct a dummy variable 
indicating whether these individuals lose their concerns (coded as 1) or not (coded 
as 0). Metaphorically speaking, individuals who lose their concerns are defined as 
‘movers’, while those who do not change are defined as ‘stayers’.  
 
Figure 3: Analysing changes of attitudes 
 
    sign of        
  year 2001  coefficient year 2002 
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= mover   
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In Models 2 and 3 in Table 2, a positive logistic regression coefficient indicates 
that it is more likely to be a ‘mover’, and a negative one indicates a higher    Seite  16 
likelihood of being a ‘stayer’. Secondly, Models 4 and 5 investigate what 
influences the change in becoming concerned from 2001 to 2002. Here the 
dependent variable is coded as 1 if someone develops concerns, and coded as 0 if 
the person has no concerns in both years. We can also define these as ‘mover’ and 
‘stayer’. However, it should be noted that in the first case, movers have no 
concerns, while in the second they do. If we observe a positive sign for an 
independent variable in both models, we only have a high fluctuation. This would 
indicate a weakly pronounced attitude. If we observe a positive coefficient for 
moving from concerned to not concerned and a negative coefficient for moving 
from not concerned to concerned, then the total number of concerned individuals 
(with this characteristic) is lower in 2002 than in 2001. 
In Models 2 and 4, we use the same variables as in Model 1, and additionally 
the month of questioning. In Models 3 and 5, we also include the difficulties in 
handling the new money and in converting prices from German marks to euros. 
First we discuss Model 2, which depicts the abandonment of concerns regarding 
the euro. We observe that the higher the formal school attainment, the greater the 
probability of changing from being concerned in 2001 to not concerned in 2002. 
There is also a strong effect for people still in school. For this group the chance of 
losing their worries is significantly higher. Compared to this, the impact of 
political interest is not very pronounced. The probability of losing worries is 
significantly higher only for those who have a high interest in politics. Using the 
Internet has a strong effect: individuals who do use this medium are more likely to 
change attitudes than people who do not use it. The pattern of expected life 
satisfaction in five years time is similar to the one observed in Model 1: 
individuals who expect to be (totally) happy in the future have a higher 
probability of losing their concerns than the ambivalent group. In contrast, people 
who expect to be unhappy in five years have a higher probability of remaining 
concerned. 
Next we look at the influence of long-lasting party preferences. People with a 
party preference for the extreme right-wing parties have a significantly higher 
probability of not giving up their concerns than supporters of the Social    Seite  17 
Democratic Party. In contrast, supporters of the Green Party have a higher 
probability of losing their concerns after introduction. The same applies to people 
without any party preferences. There is no statistically significant effect for the 
supporters of the Liberal Democratic Party. However, we have to keep in mind 
that this constitutes only a small number of cases. 
People from East Germany and foreigners from outside the EU have a higher 
probability of remaining concerned than West Germans and EU foreigners. The 
effect for non-EU foreigners is astonishing at first glance, a phenomenon we will 
discuss later. 
The month of questioning in 2002 is important for explaining changes in 
attitudes after the introduction of the euro,
14 as the German media at first reported 
positively on the euro but suddenly switched to critical coverage, especially of 
price increases. The probability of changing from being concerned to not 
concerned was at its highest in January. In the following month the probability of 
losing worries declined steadily. We illustrate this effect by calculating some 
probabilities for a more or less ‘hypothetical’ person (middle age, low-educated 
man, etc.). We observe that the probability of abandoning concerns falls 
continuously from 34% in January to 22% in May. On the other hand, if we 
calculate the probability of becoming concerned by using the results of Model 4 
(not discussed yet), we have a steady rise from 24% in January to 47% in May. 
In Model 3 we expand the set of variables, and in addition take into account the 
difficulties in handling the new money and converting prices. There are strong 
effects between continuing to be concerned about the euro and having difficulties 
with the new money. Problems in handling the euro impede the abandonment of 
worries. There are also strong negative effects for the variables, indicating the 
conversion of prices from German marks into euros. However, the coefficients are 
somewhat smaller. Again, we exemplify the influence of these two indicators for a 
more or less fictitious person (cf. Table 4). If a person has no difficulties in 
handling the new money (but some in converting prices), he has a 31% probability 
of giving up his concerns. If he has some difficulties, the probability goes down to 
18%, and the probability of abandoning his worries is very low if he has great    Seite  18 
difficulties in handling the new currency. The pattern and figures for converting 
prices are comparable. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 4: Examples of the influence of difficulties in handling the new money and 
  in converting prices from marks into euros on shifting concerns towards 
 the  euro
1 
 
  abandoning concerns  becoming concerned 












not at all  31 %  26 %  31 %  34 % 
some  18 %  18 %  49 %  49 % 
great  9 %  10 %  74 %  49 % 
= =
1 Probabilities calculated out of Models 3 and 5 for a 46-year-old, low-
educated male with middle income and ambivalent future expectations who 
does not use the Internet, who has little interest in politics and no party 
preferences, and who gave his interview in February.  
2 This man also has some difficulties in converting prices. 
3 This man also has some difficulties in handling the new money. 
 
If we compare the coefficients of the other variables included in Model 2 and 
in Model 3, they are fairly similar, albeit with some exceptions. There is no 
significant influence of political interest in Model 3. This could be interpreted to 
mean that people with political interest are better informed on the euro and can 
handle it better. The other remarkable changes are those regarding origins. East 
Germans still have the lowest probability of losing their concerns. The lowest 
concerns observable are for EU foreigners. Here, they differ significantly from 
West Germans (whereas in Model 2 they did not). Other foreigners in Models 2 
and 3 are comparable with East and West Germans, respectively. Controlling for 
handling of the currency causes these displacements. Simple cross-tabulations 
reveal that both groups of foreigners have greater problems in handling the new 
currency. Not controlling for this produces negatively biased effects for 
foreigners.    Seite  19 
In Models 4 and 5, we take the opposite perspective, and look at the change 
from being unconcerned in 2001 to being concerned in 2002. The effects are 
similar to those in Models 2 and 3: here, a positive coefficient here leads to less 
people being concerned, and in Models 4 and 5, a negative coefficient prevents 
people from becoming concerned. It should be accentuated that in Models 4 and 
5, the income effects are not only significant for the high income group (with a 
higher probability to stay in the group without worries), but also for the lowest 
income group. They have a higher probability to change their attitude from 2001 
(not concerned) to 2002 (being concerned) compared to middle income groups. 
This may be due to the fact that real price increases and the discussion on this 
topic in the media affected people with low income particularly strongly. 
It is worth pointing out that the difficulties in handling the new money have a 
particularly strong influence on people’s concerns. In the third column of Table 4, 
we calculate the probabilities of becoming concerned with respect to difficulties 
in handling the new money. If our hypothetical person has no difficulties in this 
area, he has a 31% probability of becoming concerned. If the same person has 
some difficulties, the probability rises to 49% and if they experience great 
problems, the figure rises to 74%. In comparison, the influence of converting 
prices (last column) is much lower. 
 
5.  Conclusion and outlook 
The theory of reactance, which implies an increase in worries after the 
introduction of the euro, does not provide a plausible explanation of attitude 
changes in Germany given the decline in worries from 2001 to 2002. Looking at 
the development in concerns in the year 2002 differentially, we see that they fell 
directly after the euro notes and coins were distributed. However, this drop was 
only temporary.  
The theory of cognitive dissonance implies declining worries after introduction 
because people want to abolish the stress that emerges if they remain opposed to 
the new currency. As concerns do not fall steadily – in fact, quite the opposite –    Seite  20 
this theory does not seem adequate. The same prediction can be traced using a 
theory of self-perception but the reasoning is different. If the attitude towards the 
euro is accompanied by little knowledge about the euro, the new situation is real 
(the euro is the official currency) and people act adequately (paying with euros) 
then people infer their attitude from their behaviour. We observe that people with 
difficulties in handling the new money continue to have or develop concerns. This 
is in line with the theory of self-perception, whereby problems impede a positive 
attitude. However, when controlling for this, there should be no significant effect 
in later months on remaining and becoming concerned. 
The strong decline in worries from 2001 to 2002 and the re-increase since 
February 2002 provide hints supporting the theory of attitude change as a result of 
learning processes. First, individuals with difficulties in handling the money are 
more concerned. Second, school attendance and Internet usage, which are 
indicators of knowledge and access to information, influence the loss of concerns 
and prevent concerns from being developed. Third, the re-increase in concerns 
runs parallel to the change in press coverage. 
The introduction of a single European currency, the euro, is one of the biggest 
political projects undertaken up to now promoting European unity. However, in 
some states acceptance is still not high, even two years after the currency’s 
introduction, as is the case in Germany. However, widespread acceptance of the 
new currency is absolutely necessary for the idea of Europe to succeed. Its failure 
could promote historic tensions and resentments within Europe. 
Three members of the European Union currently remain outside the EMU. But 
since May 2004, ten Eastern European countries have become new members of 
the EU, and at least some of them are expected join the EMU and introduce the 
euro currency in the near future. In order to minimise their problems in 
introducing the euro, it is worth looking at what has happened in the countries that 
introduced the euro in January 2002 to find hints for practical measures that can 
help reduce the population’s concerns. Although general beliefs and educational 
levels cannot readily be changed, our findings for Germany show that people with 
better access to information are less concerned about the new currency. We also    Seite  21 
found that difficulties in handling a new currency have a particularly strong 
influence on general concerns regarding that currency. Taking all of these factors 
into account, it seems that providing the population with more information could 
reduce concerns. Additionally, the discussion about price increases in the German 
press suggests that the use of double pricing (in the old currency and in euros) 
could be helpful: this would lead to a decrease in handling difficulties and 
consequently to lower concerns. Furthermore, it would probably even prevent real 
or just ‘subjectively felt’ price increases. Price increases do indeed seem to 
influence concerns: we argue that the monthly pattern of remaining and becoming 
concerned in 2002 is traceable back to media reports on price increases. 
Finally, the empirical analyses presented above show that those who profit 
most from the new currency in Germany – EU foreigners – have lower concerns 
about the euro. However, the abolishment of the exchange rate and the 
opportunity to make direct price comparisons are advantageous not only for EU 
foreigners but also for Germans travelling to other countries in EMU. This 
advantage will be experienced as well by every individual who is a citizen of one 
EMU country and travels or works in another one. 
 
 
                                                 
1 According to the Theory of Social Identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) social identity is 
defined primarily according to those aspects perceived as strengths of the “ingroup”. 
Therefore, national pride is also generated by issues where citizens of one state appear to 
be better off than those of another. 
2 Primary control is present if in fact control can be exercised. In order to produce a 
person-environment-congruence or to reduce dissonance, it is sufficient if secondary 
control is exercised on a cognitive level. Thereby, ones own motives and goals are 
adapted to the given situation. 
3 It should be noted however, that their evidence is based on only 40 persons. 
4 Recent questionnaires are available at 
http://www.diw.de/english/sop/service/fragen/index.html. 
5 Müller-Peters (2001, p. 38f.) found that countries where life satisfaction is higher on 
average in EU comparison tend to reject the euro more than in countries with low life 
satisfaction, which tend to endorse the euro. On the other hand, looking at the individual 
level, the picture is reversed: the more satisfied individuals are, the greater their 
acceptance of the new currency and vice versa. 
6 For each party preference, we construct a dummy variable. It should be noted that nearly 
half of the respondents report not having any party affiliation.    Seite  22 
                                                                                                                                      
7 We construct four dummy variables: one for West Germans, one for East Germans, one 
for foreigners with an EU passport and one for other foreigners. 
8 See Winship and Mare (1984) for details of regression models with ordinal variables. 
9 The variable highest school level differentiates between individuals with no formal 
school-leaving certificate and those who graduated only from compulsory schooling 
(lowest category). Then we have individuals with intermediate general qualifications 
(middle category) and the highest category, including people with minimum maturity 
certificates. A fourth category contains those who are still in school. 
10 Using the Internet includes all individuals who state that they use Internet either 
privately or professionally.  
11 We differentiate between Germans, separated for individuals living in East and West 
Germany, and foreigners. The latter are differentiated between foreigners from an EU 
country (also including the three states which are not participating) and from all other 
states. 
12 We use needs-adjusted equivalence incomes and group them into four quartiles, but we 
only include the lowest and highest quartile in the regression model. 
13 For details see Long (1997, p. 50ff). 
14 As the SOEP interviews are face-to-face and the number of interviews is high, the 
fieldwork takes a few months. Each interview month is covered by a dummy variable, 
except for those in June or later. They are summarised in one dummy, as the number of 
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